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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLARENCE K.K. CHINN United States Army

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the U.S. strategy for combating international terrorism. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, brought new meaning to asymmetric warfare and mandated that the United States develop a clear and cohesive strategy to protect the people of this nation against international terrorism. This paper reviews the evolution of the U.S. policy on combating terrorism and then discusses the current policy on combating terrorism and shortfalls in the current policy. The paper concludes with recommendations on how the national elements of power should be used in combating international terrorism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	***************************************	iii
COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM		1
CENTERS OF GRAVITY		1
U.S. POLICY PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001		3
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY		4
U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001		6
U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS		7
STRATEGY		8
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY		8
DIPLOMATIC POWER		10
ECONOMIC POWER		12
INFORMATIONAL POWER	Neg .	13
MILITARY POWER	4 2	15
CONCLUSION		18
ENDNOTES		21
BIBLIOGRAPHY		25

vi

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: UNTHINKABLE

In a day of mind-numbing horror, America watched as the World Trade Center was destroyed, the Pentagon was attacked, planes crashed and thousands were killed as terrorists shook our nation to its core.¹

Most of history is a pageant of asymmetries. It is mostly the asymmetries that cause history to happen America, in the spasms of a few hours, became a changed country. It turned, at last, out of the 1990's. The menu of American priorities was rearranged.²

On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked on American soil by a global terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden. Over 3000 innocent civilians or non-combatants were killed. This asymmetric attack mandates that the United States develop a clear and cohesive strategy to protect the people of this nation against terrorism. America's war on terrorism requires a long-term strategy that will include all the elements of power: political, economic, informational and military. The strategy will require America to use a multitude of tools. Every tool will have its role and contribute to the grand strategy of winning this war on terrorism.

In this paper I will outline the United States policy on combating terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, discuss what the current United States policy on combating terrorism is, and conclude with how the national elements of power should be used to implement the new U.S. policy on combating terrorism.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

The enemy strategic center of gravity in this war on terrorism is each global terrorist organization's will or belief that violence is an acceptable way to achieve their political agenda. As an example, militant Islam would be a strategic center of gravity. Militant Islam is the source of power that requires/demands members of this belief to commit acts of terrorism. Islam by nature does not condone terrorism nor does it support the killing of innocent people. However, militant Islam provides its members the freedom of action, physical strength and will to fight (required to be a terrorist). Believers in militant Islam are convinced that terrorism allows them to achieve their political objectives: to expel U.S. and western influences from the Middle East and overthrow nations they deem as "Un-Islamic regimes."

The enemy operational center of gravity is the leadership of all global terrorist organizations. The leaders profess and persuade their members to commit acts of violence as

a way to achieve their political objectives. The leaders are ordering the violence as Osama bin Laden did in February 1998 when he said "it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens civilian or military – and their allies everywhere." When the leadership of a state/global terrorist organization changes and/or the leader makes a commitment that their organization or nation will no longer use violence or support future use of violence as a way to achieve their objectives, the state/organization ceases to exist as a global terrorist threat. Many nations and organizations have made this transition in the past. As an example, Iraq in 1982 was removed from the U.S. State Department's state sponsored terrorism list (put back on in 1990 after invading Kuwait) and in 2001 the Japanese Red Army and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement were removed from the designated foreign terrorist organization list.4 The total destruction of all leadership in a given global terrorist organization sends a strong message to all other terrorists contemplating a global terrorist act. The precedent must be set with the Taliban and al Queda. Nation state leaders, potential global terrorist leaders and current terrorist leaders must be dissuaded and deterred by the completeness of the destruction of the Taliban and al Queda such that they commit their state/organization to disavow the use of violence to achieve their objectives and seek removal from the U.S. State Department's state sponsored terrorism and foreign terrorist organization lists.

The enemy tactical center of gravity is the loyal subordinates of the terrorist organization that are willing to use violence as a way to achieve the organization's objectives. If we eliminate the loyal subordinates willing to use violence as a means of expression, then there will be no more violence. We can eliminate these loyal subordinates at the tactical level by striking their training camps and safe havens. These strikes eliminate the creation of future terrorist cells and affect the organization's ability to recruit. We can also attack loyal subordinates not willing to use violence but supportive of the organization by completely dismantling their financial network and by making it difficult for them to move or operate with any degree of security. As an example, Afghanistan is no longer considered a safe haven for the Taliban and al Queda. Loyal subordinates of both organizations in Afghanistan are either dead, captured or being currently hunted down. Afghanistan is a sanctuary destroyed. When we deny the terrorists sanctuary with the visible strikes on training camps and their perceived safe havens we make a statement to the world and also remind the American people of the resolve required to win the global war on terrorism. If the loyal subordinates are unwilling to use violence as a way to achieve the organization's objectives they will cease to exist as a foreign terrorist organization.

The visible strikes against terrorism must be effective and supported by the United Nations and NATO. The military must conduct thorough planning and preparation for these

operations. The intent is not only to convince the loyal subordinates of the global terrorist organization but also their leadership that further pursuit of their political objectives through violence is not worth the cost because all of their centers of gravity are threatened, controlled, or occupied and there are no options for restoring them. We must defeat international terrorism wherever we find it. Our strategy must also protect our center of gravity, the American will to prosecute this war on terrorism until the swamp has been drained of all terrorists.

U.S. POLICY PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The U.S. did not have a formal policy on terrorism until 1986. The terrorism policy was initially formalized under President Reagan with National Security Decision Directive 207 (NSDD 207). This formal policy was the result of the findings of the 1985 Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism, which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the significant federal assets needed to respond to terrorist incidents. NSDD 207 reaffirmed the lead agency responsibilities of past policy. The State Department remained responsible for international terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) remained responsible for dealing with domestic terrorist acts while acting through the Department of Justice. The FBI also had the authority to investigate terrorism against Americans abroad.

However, prior to September 11, 2001 the foundation for the United States policy on combating terrorism was Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), "United States Policy on Counterterrorism." The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City led to the issuance of PDD-39 in June 1995. 6

"It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks."

The foundation for U.S. policy on combating terrorism was further defined with Presidential Decision Directives, PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas" and PDD-63, "Critical Infrastructure Protection." Both were signed by President Clinton in May of 1998 to protect against the increasing likelihood that terrorists would disrupt the Nation's critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass destruction against our citizens. PDD-62 reaffirmed the basic principles of PDD-39, but clarified and

reinforced the specific missions of the many U.S. agencies charged with defeating and defending against terrorism, and created a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. PDD-62 also established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. Some of the responsibilities of the National Coordinator were to oversee the broad variety of relevant policies and programs in the area of counter-terrorism and provide advice regarding budgets for counter-terror programs.8 PDD-62 also reaffirmed PDD-39 in that the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would continue to serve as the lead federal agency for "crisis management" and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would continue to serve as the lead federal agency for "consequence management." The intent of PDD-63 was to assure the continuity and viability of critical infrastructures by taking all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems. Twelve lead agencies were designated for specific sectors and functions. The National Coordinator, in conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials, and a representative from the National Economic Council were designated overall responsible for the preparation and overall coordination and integration of the plans.10 Both PDD's reinforced PDD-39 and were primarily domestically oriented on crisis and consequence management.

As President Clinton left office, he had created and filled the post of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism. Three presidential decision directives now coordinated the efforts of senior counterterrorism personnel from various government agencies in dealing with threats at home.¹¹ These PDD's provided the interagency foundation for combating terrorism.

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY

One of the major problems with the previous policy was that there was no federal or national strategy on combating terrorism that had a clear desired outcome. Although three presidential decision directives were in place they did not reflect a cohesive strategy for combating terrorism. With no strategy and endstate it was difficult for each agency to measure success and be held accountable for funding what is in the nation's best interest. The National Coordinator had no budgetary control over the agencies so unless the agencies were willing to spend a portion of their budget on combating terrorism the requirement was not funded. The National Coordinator needed to have budgetary power or Presidential/Congressional support to

ensure recommendations that the department and agency representatives concluded were in the nation's best interest were funded and implemented.

How effective was our combating terrorism policy prior to September 11, 2001? Here we see an asymmetry between perception and reality. In international terrorism, the world was a far more dangerous place for Americans in the 1980s, when 571 Americans perished in 1,701 attacks against U.S. targets, than during the 1990s when the supposedly more lethal new terrorism claimed the lives of 87 Americans in a total of 1,372 attacks. Domestically, according to FBI statistics, far fewer terrorist incidents (29) were recorded in the U.S. during the 1990s (up to 1998, last year of published data from the FBI), than the previous decade (220). Domestically, 176 persons were killed in the U.S. during the 1990s: a figure nearly seven times the 1980s total of just 26 persons. However, this tragic death toll is the result of four out of the 29 terrorist incidents, the Oklahoma City bombing accounts for 95 percent of the total. The magnitude and lethality of the attacks have changed but what do the facts tell us about our combating terrorism policy? The facts clearly show that the attacks and incidents decreased, contrary to popular belief. This perception exists because the lethality of the successful attacks. The conclusion that can be drawn from the statistics is that U.S. policy on combating terrorism had been effective in reducing attacks and incidents on Americans.

In April 2001, The State Department released its annual Terrorism report, which is required by the U.S. Congress. The report "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000," reiterates our four basic policy tenets on combating terrorism:

"First, make no concession to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance."

15

When the report was released, Secretary of State Colin Powell said "we are achieving the basic objectives of the United States counterterrorism strategy: isolation of countries and groups that support terrorism, disruption of terrorist planning and operations, sharing of information, and the apprehension and trial of perpetrators." International cooperation against terrorism was evident with UN Security Council resolution 1333, which levied additional sanctions on the Taliban for harboring Osama Bin Laden and failing to close down terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. This resolution passed a year after its predecessor resolution 1267 and showed the extent to which the international community was prepared to go to isolate those states that refuse to adhere to international norms.¹⁷

Although the statistics and cooperation of the international community in combating terrorism demonstrates the success of the U.S. policy on combating terrorism prior to September 11, 2001, the question must be asked – How did the unthinkable happen on September 11, 2001? The answer is simple; this was asymmetric warfare at its best. The asymmetric attack on September 11, 2001 will go down in American history as another day that will live in infamy. How has America responded?

U.S. POLICY RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

On September 20, 2001, President Bush in an address to the Joint session of Congress and the American people responded by declaring war on terrorism. President Bush called for the defeat of the global terror network and every government that supports them. Other components of the policy are:

War on terrorism begins with al Queda - the group and its leader Osama bin Laden. The war will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.

Demands on Taliban: deliver to U.S. authorities all leaders of al Queda who hide in your land, release foreign nationals, including American citizens, protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country, close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and give the U.S. full access to inspect terrorist training camps.

From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime.

Creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to the President - the Office of Homeland Security.

Warns this will be a long campaign utilizing every resource at our command: every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – we will not stop until the defeat of the global terror network. 18

How do we implement this policy and what is the strategy for using the national elements of power in this war on terrorism? Diplomacy will be the key element of power in this protracted war. The U.S. political leadership must attack the strategic center of gravity in this war, militant Islam and indirectly attack the leaders of the organization by depriving them of allies/friends and weaken the organization's will by undermining their popular support. The economic element must attack both the operational and tactical centers of gravity by identifying and seizing all financial assets of terrorism. This dissuades and deters leaders and all subordinates of a global terrorist organization because without assets their ability to move, work and operate is

restricted. The informational element must attack all centers of gravity (militant Islam, leadership and subordinates of al Queda and Taliban) by spreading the message that violence is not an acceptable way to achieve political objectives. Terrorism will not succeed and global terrorist organizations must look for another form of expression to achieve their political objectives. The military element must be used to attack both tactical and operational centers of gravity by overwhelming and crippling terrorist capabilities. This campaign must be conducted using all elements of power; thereby overwhelming the terrorist organization at all turns from multiple dimensions. There can be no sanctuary or respite for the terrorists or the nations who harbor them.

This war will require America's leaders to continually assess every element of national power to insure each element is being used in accordance with our policy and national interests. We must adapt the elements of power faster than the terrorist's adapt their methods. We must get inside the terrorists decision cycle and implement the national elements of power against their plans. By staying three or four moves ahead of the terrorists we will maintain a constant advantage of position in order to close all options, wear him down and eventually collapse his will.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Before we discuss in more detail how the national elements of power should be used, it is important to review our four enduring national interests and how they apply to the global war on terrorism:

Defense of the Homeland: Protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers.

Favorable World Order (international security): Establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or cope with aggression (collective security from terrorists).

Economic Well-Being: Promotion of U.S. international trade and investment, including protection of private interests in foreign countries.

Promotion of Values (ideology): Promulgation of a set of values that U.S. leaders believe to be universally good and worthy of emulation by other countries (value of freedom from terrorism).¹⁹

It is critical that we understand our national interests in this war on terrorism because they are the building blocks in justifying this war on terrorism. Additionally, many if not all of our

national interests will be the same justification other nations will use to join the international coalition in this war on terrorism.

STRATEGY

President Bush stated our national policy but what is our strategy for winning this war?

The interim United States grand strategy for the war against terrorism has been elaborated many times by Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department. As Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Sheehan served in the key office for developing, coordinating and implementing the counterterrorism policy effort overseas. The strategy of "draining the swamp" means to limit the room in which terrorists operate, plan, move, and work. We work to show terrorists that there is no room, both physically and politically, for them to use terrorism as their means of expression. Terrorists can only exist if they have space where they can recruit, train, plan, and find refuge. They find this space in countries or areas where a state allows them to operate or where no legitimate government has control. The focus of this strategy is to convince the global terrorist leadership and subordinates that the use of violence to achieve their goals will lead to their demise as a global organization capable of effecting change. This is not a complete national strategy but it is a start to where no clear national strategy existed previously. Presidential Decision Directives existed but no national strategy was ever elaborated by the President.

The National Security Council (NSC) must develop and have the President sign a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) that formally outlines a comprehensive national strategy on combating international terrorism. This NSPD should be similar to NSC 68 in scope and provide the long term vision for the war on terrorism. The NSPD must define desired outcomes so department and agencies can measure their success in combating terrorism. The NSPD must also provide the direction needed to insure department and agency leaders fund recommended anti- and counter-terrorism measures. The national strategy is also required so the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy can be nested underneath it. The CJCS staff will need to develop a comprehensive campaign plan similar to the Victory Plan of 1941 developed by Wedemeyer in World War II. This campaign plan will provide a starting point for all future operations in this lengthy war on terrorism.

OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The Office of Homeland Security created with an executive order by President Bush will be responsible for leading, overseeing and coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks in the future. Additionally, the Office of Homeland Security will have the responsibility of coordinating all federal departments, agencies, state and local governments.²² The office must synergize the efforts of all these key organizations and obtain realistic budget support from Congress for the development of our new national security capability. This is the opportunity to fulfill the initial intent of the National Coordinator in synchronizing and integrating the interagency process in combating terrorism. Currently, the President and Congress are fully supportive of resource requirements deemed in the nation's best interest in this war against terrorism. Now is the time to knock down interagency budgetary constraints in funding requirements critical to safeguarding American citizens and our future as a nation.

The creation of an office versus an agency is beneficial because it eliminates the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles the office would face if parts of current agencies are moved to a new agency. A key responsibility of this office is to protect our center of gravity, the American will to prosecute this war on terrorism until the swamp has been drained of all terrorists. The office must engage the American people daily and monthly on the 11th day with a unique and different ceremony to honor fallen patriots. The House resolution designating September 11 as Patriot Day is a step in the right direction. We must not lose our resolve in this projected long war against terrorism.

The challenge with funding the war on terrorism is still present but, due to September 11, 2001, funding from Congress should be made available and other departments, agencies, state and local governments will be asked to support the strategy that will tell them what to do, how to do it and how to mobilize resources. The Office of Homeland Security has no budget, only the persuasive expertise of their director, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. Since Mr. Ridge cannot compel other cabinet members to support his strategy, he must wield his political power with the President's backing to insure combating terrorism is adequately funded.

A key to success for the Office of Homeland Security will be how quickly the office can integrate and coordinate the many different agencies and demonstrate the effectiveness of his office. The Office of Homeland Security cannot become another layer of bureaucracy. The efficiency and effectiveness in organizing the prevention of future attacks will be their cornerstone to success. They must prioritize force protection equipment and continually seek better means of utilizing surveillance technology as a means to reducing costs.

Once U.S. combat action ceases in Afghanistan, the Office of Homeland Security must be prepared to take the lead media role in the global war on terrorism from the Department of Defense (e.g., daily substantial briefings on what we have done today to protect the American people from global terrorism as we slowly drain the swamp). This global war on terrorism will be

long and Mr. Ridge must not allow the American people to lose their will to prosecute this war on terrorism until we claim victory.

Mr. Ridge must develop his organization to provide direction and guidance for the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. His organization must remedy past failures and maximize unity of effort at all governmental levels to prevent and defeat terrorism.

DIPLOMATIC POWER

Diplomacy will be the key tool in building the international coalition, keeping it together, and maintaining international opinion behind the U.S. in this global war against terrorism. The President, Mr. Ridge and senior officials must exert their leadership and diplomatic power in this global war on terrorism. Our initial political objective in this war on terrorism must be to prevent the terrorists from dividing the Muslim world from the rest of the world. Militant Islam must not be accepted as a vehicle to effect change. The diplomats must shape world opinion on terrorism by emphasizing this is a war between good (Islam) versus evil (Militant Islam) vice America against terrorism – a war of freedom from terrorism or fear.

We must continue to work through the United Nations to pass resolutions authorizing the coalition to take action with all elements of power against terrorists with global reach. The United Nations has 12 international counterterrorism treaties, only 5 of the 12 treaties have been ratified by more than 100 countries.²³ U.S. leaders must persuade all countries to ratify the 12 treaties. These treaties allow international cooperation to work smoothly, enabling the exercise of universal jurisdiction over terrorists.

We need to build alliances because every nation has its own national interests. Some of those interests may not be the same as ours. Some will support us openly and some only in secrecy. We have to be flexible and be able to work through these nuances. Providing detailed and believable intelligence will help to maintain full support.

In the past our most essential and effective tool in combating terrorism has been cooperation with friendly governments and even some not so friendly.²⁴ We must open a dialog with countries that have harbored terrorists in the past and persuade them to change their policies. If we cannot persuade these countries then we must ask allies, who may have better and more extensive relations, to bring serious diplomatic leverage to bear on those countries that continue to support terrorism. We must demand that nations accept their responsibility for law enforcement against terrorist organizations with global reach, implying that they control any citizen-terrorists and terrorist organizations operating within their border. Failing or weak states must either bolster their own capacity to fight terrorism or request international assistance in

defeating internal terrorist organizations with global reach. We can assist failing or weak states in protecting their sovereignty through international training programs and intelligence sharing. Merged intelligence and law enforcement will be critical in eliminating safe houses, supporting terrorist organizations, suppliers of arms, and closing down of bank accounts. In some situations we must be willing to allow Special Forces to become combat advisors and accept the associated risk. When we do this we cannot deceive the American public. The American public must be told in no uncertain terms what we are doing and why by the President.

There are two areas in this war on terrorism that we must be wary of. One area that will be of significant concern throughout this war on terrorism, especially when we are combating terrorism in the Middle East, will be the Arab-Israeli conflict or Palestinian problem. We must play a stronger role in facilitating a peaceful solution that must include the creation of a Palestine State. The United States support for a Palestine State will contribute to changing some of the perceptions of the United States in the Middle East but more importantly would contribute to a climate in which Middle East terrorist organizations could be further isolated. Once Palestine becomes a recognized state they must control their citizen-terrorists and terrorist organizations operating within their border or suffer United Nation sanctions and scorn. The other concern is insuring that nations do not become destabilized from supporting this war on terrorism. This is especially critical with Pakistan and other nuclear capable states since we do not want any uncertainty as to the control of their nuclear inventory.

How can we measure success in the political arena? There will be success as long as all members of the coalition continue to support the war on terrorism in their own unique manner (political statements, financial disruption, intelligence sharing, internal security operations, overflight permission, basing rights, military operations). We must continue to keep international opinion behind the United States. Success will also occur when the United Nations enforces resolutions against terrorists. Three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267(NOV 1999), 1333(DEC 2000), 1363(JUL 2001) demanded that the Afghan Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden to appropriate authorities. The Taliban ignored all resolutions. These resolutions provide the legal and political framework for the use of military power (e.g., U.S. unleashed its military power in Afghanistan as a means of enforcing the United Nations resolutions). In the long run, success will be when we re-establish a secure international order (i.e., terrorist organizations with global reach and nations that harbor terrorists understand the consequences of terrorism and do not have the will to conduct terrorist activities). Politically we show the terrorists that there is no room for terrorist violence. Finally, success can be measured when we have set the conditions so the other elements of power can be effectively used.

ECONOMIC POWER

Once the conditions have been set diplomatically, the economic element of national power must be used to complement the military and informational strategy. Our economic objective is a stable U.S. and world economy with some level of predictability. Providing foreign aid, increased trade and forgiving debts will be part of the long-term strategy for dealing with terrorism and will be part of the carrot used by the diplomats to assist in maintaining the coalition. Providing aid, especially Foreign Military Financing (FMF) credits allows nations like Pakistan, Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia to support our effort against terrorism by bolstering their internal campaign against terrorism. FMF can be used to purchase American equipment to modernize their armed forces and police forces, which increases our interoperability with them. FMF may also be used to send mobile training teams (Special Forces, contractors, etc.) to assist countries in counter-terrorist efforts and overall military modernization. These FMF credits build trust and confidence between our two militaries and provide for a more professional military in that nation. The ultimate aim is for all nations to have the capability to exercise their own sovereignty over their territory in the fight against terrorism. FMF credits will provide the opportunity for nations to support us in limiting the room terrorists have to operate, plan, train, move and work.

Additionally, we must immediately provide humanitarian aid to Muslims in Afghanistan and its bordering countries. We must begin to win the hearts and minds by "carpet bombing" the people with food, clothing and medicine. This is an important aspect of the informational campaign to demonstrate to the world that this is not a war against Muslims or Arabs.

The economic instrument must also be used as a stick in the form of economic sanctions. The State Department designates state sponsors of terrorism and once designated this means economic sanctions are forthcoming. Economic sanctions have two goals: first, to change the behavior of the states by encouraging them to move away from supporting acts, or groups that use and advocate terrorism. Second, to keep resources away from the states, which targets their ability to support terrorism. Sanctions have worked with Libya, who expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, and there is no longer evidence that terrorist camps still exist in Libya. Sanctions will become more effective now because the September 11, 2001 asymmetric attacks have forced nations to openly declare opposition to terrorism. No nation wants to be known as a supporter of terrorism. The tough rhetoric the U.S. has taken, declaring that nations are either with us or against us will further solidify the effectiveness of sanctions as almost all will be multi-lateral versus unilateral. We must continue to work with the United Nations, G-8, OAS, and EU partners to also bar trade with nations that support terrorism. We must use the designation of

most favorable nation status as both a stick and carrot. We must also work with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to influence control over loans and investments to nations.

One of the most effective ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. This is gaining importance because of the shift of terrorist groups from being sponsored by states to international networks of terrorists not affiliated with particular governments. The State Department designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations every two years. Once designated, the financial assets of the designated terrorist organizations are frozen. The international sharing of information and the identification of all terrorist financial networks is critical to disrupting their financing. We can facilitate better international cooperation by encouraging all nations to create financial intelligence units. These units are part of the cyber war we must win against the terrorists. The units will disrupt financial flows and dry up the financial capabilities of terrorists to operate, move and plan. All of these actions contribute to identifying and seizing all financial assets of terrorism. The places where terrorists can hide their assets will rapidly dwindle in the future. Disrupting their financing lowers the level of the swamp and forces the terrorist networks to do things differently, increasing their vulnerability.

How can we measure success in the economic arena? Success will be a stable U.S. and world economy with some level of predictability and the eventual removal of all nations and terrorist organizations from the State Department's designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and State Sponsors of terrorism lists. Success will occur when economic sanctions dry up one of the foundations of a global terrorist network, their financial network. This is a critical vulnerability of terrorists that we must fully engage. Economic sanctions will continually isolate the terrorist organizations and force them to change the way they operate. Finally, we must continue to provide economic support and other assistance to countries that are being hurt or may be hurt by supporting this war on terrorism. This may mean we form an alliance that quarantees U.S. support and protection against both internal and external threats.

INFORMATIONAL POWER

This war will be different. We will need to conduct our own asymmetric attack against terrorist organizations. This will be an informational war that can only be won if the President uses his political clout both domestically and internationally to set the conditions for use of all the elements of national power. The President and his senior Cabinet level leaders must lead from the front in both the international community and with the American public by educating the

public on the war on terrorism and win the battle for their hearts and minds. The aim is to reduce the public support and sympathy from those that threaten terrorism. To do this we must have many varied and diverse themes with global reach. Several of the key themes are; the need to reestablish international order because an attack against me is an attack against all, good versus evil, war of freedom from terrorism or fear, the enemy is not our Muslim or Arab friends but the global terror network and every government that supports them. We can also focus in on the human tragedy of the September 11, 2001 attack, the terrorist strikes were against innocent people (over 3000 people from 81 countries, many were Muslims) and that this will be a long war requiring resolve and sacrifice. Another point is that in the recent past the U.S. has taken action five times on behalf of Muslim populations against outside invaders or oppressive regimes.

Currently, Secretary of Defense Rumsfield is taking the lead in engaging the American public on the war on terrorism by holding a daily noontime press conference. Secretary Rumsfield understands our center of gravity in this fight is the American will to prosecute this war on terrorism until the swamp has been drained of all terrorists. He is making it a priority to be available for the conference everyday so the media gets the story right and to explain in detail how America is slowly draining the swamp in Afghanistan until all terrorists (al Queda leadership) and those who harbor terrorists (Taliban) are exposed. The total destruction of the Taliban and al Queda in Afghanistan along with the battle to win the hearts and minds of the international community is cutting off the supply of future terrorist recruits.

We must use globalization of the media to our advantage. We must harness the tremendous power and ability of the media to influence public opinion and foreign policy. We need to work with the media (domestically and internationally: BBC, SKY, EURONET, Al Jazeera and other regional broadcasters) to facilitate telling our story. We have mutually supporting interests and both sides can manipulate each other to serve their interests. We must keep the media engaged so they broadcast our interests and present our perspective.

We must warn the American media about safeguarding future military operations and our national security interests. The media should be told in no uncertain terms that they will be held responsible if they create another "Princess Diana" situation on a future military operation if they violate the ground rules under which we give them access to current operations.

Another aspect of the information war will be keeping the coalition against terrorism engaged and heard. We will need to consult with the coalition often and provide them information so they are not surprised by our actions. Additionally, we have a tremendous opportunity for international cooperation in the sharing of intelligence about terrorist

organizations. This is important because no one knows who holds the missing piece of the puzzle that will stop the next global terrorist attack. We need the ability to defend, protect, and to anticipate where the next potential targets are and respond. International cooperation such as sharing intelligence about terrorist organizations is critical to assisting the law enforcement agencies in their fight against the war on terrorism. Intelligence sharing is a must in this war on terrorism. We cannot get inside the terrorists' decision cycle without global cooperation. Equally important is the development and maintenance of intelligence collection capabilities and an analysis approach that will allow us to better understand the intentions and motivations as well as the capabilities of potentially hostile states and global terrorist organizations.

We must also work to insure that all forms of terrorism are criminalized. Countries ratifying the 12 international counterterrorism treaties that create universal jurisdiction is a start. Our law enforcement and other agencies must work with other governments to assist them in developing laws that criminalize all terrorist acts. When we do this we are draining the swamp. There is nowhere to hide, wherever their terror attack occurs it is a crime, and they can be tried or extradited. The endstate is that it will be a crime to be a terrorist, conspire with a terrorist, or help a terrorist in every corner of the globe.

How can we measure success in the information arena? Success will be solidarity of all nations in appropriate actions against terrorists or nations that harbor them; when we demonstrate the intestinal fortitude as a nation to win this war for freedom against terrorism despite military setbacks (deaths, mission failure); when intelligence cooperation provides the intelligence required for law enforcement officials or the military to stop a terrorist attack; when our mobilization and actions deter terrorists from attacking because they are worried they will be caught or their operation will be interfered with; and when Al Jazeera broadcasts include a daily dose of political and religious Muslim leaders openly condemning terrorist organizations that have their root in militant Islam. We must force the terrorists to be cautious, second guess themselves and make adjustments. This is part of the strategy of draining the swamp. The informational element sets the conditions for all the other elements of power to operate with global legitimacy.

MILITARY POWER

Military action must be used to defeat terrorists and their support structures under our conditions. Intelligence sharing will allow us to set the conditions and decide when, where, and whether to strike global terrorist networks. Strikes against the organizational leadership and training camps will provide the visible resolve the President promised. The military element will

be focused on modifying the behavior of the multiple terrorist networks across the globe so they do not export terror worldwide. Military action must force the terrorist leadership to realize that there is no room to hide, even in their own "secure" areas. When this occurs, demoralization is just around the corner and the terrorist network will collapse from within. The military must continue operations until we are satisfied that the terrorist networks have been completely destroyed.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. provided the Taliban the opportunity to hand over Osama bin Laden and all lieutenants of al Queda. When they refused, they told the world Afghanistan as a state had made a choice to harbor a recognized terrorist network with global reach. This action isolated the Taliban and Osama bin Laden from world support and brought initiation of military action. The military coalition provided air power support to the Northern Alliance and the people of Afghanistan so they could fight to regain control of their country with some legitimacy. Our commitment of Special Forces as combat advisors to the Northern Alliance as they maneuvered against the Taliban greatly reduced the number of U.S. conventional forces required for victory. The lesson learned is that Special Forces employed as combat advisors can be a tremendous force multiplier when judiciously used.

As the Northern Alliance eliminates the last vestiges of the Taliban and al Queda from Afghanistan, we must capture or kill Osama bin Laden and all of his lieutenants. We must be relentless in our pursuit of these leaders of al Queda and cannot allow them to relocate. We cannot fail in this critical task as this sets the precedent for other countries that harbor terrorists. The focus is to make sure all other terrorist organizations contemplating terrorist acts understand that the cost of committing a future act is total annihilation.

Worldwide we must continue to execute conventional flexible deterrent options to dissuade opportunism with carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, fighter bomber aircraft and air operations. A strong presence combined with information operations (worldwide news coverage) is very compelling to nation states. Conventional Army ground forces should be minimized in the Middle East and no permanent bases should be established in Afghanistan. However, Special Forces must be engaged extensively not only in Afghanistan and neighboring nations but worldwide to shape the security environment. Committing Special Forces teams into an area at the first signs of trouble can potentially defuse an emerging problem. If not, those teams can provide the Commander in Chief (CINC) with the ground truth he requires to implement appropriate solutions, ideally well short of actual military intervention. Special Forces must train and provide the planning guidance to military forces so they can go after terrorists on their own soil. Special Forces help us take the war to the terrorists, wherever they

may be. This increase in military to military contacts will assist in providing the intelligence community information on what is happening internally in a nation. We can either be engaged now and potentially influence the action or wonder why things happened and become engaged at a time and place not to our choosing. We must not be surprised again.

This war on terrorism will be a different kind of war. It may be the first war where a functional headquarters, the U.S. Special Operations Command, is the supported CINC, and the regional warfighting CINCs are in support.²⁸

U.S. conventional military dominance encourages future adversaries and competitors to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States. Conventional military dominance does not act as a deterrent to global terrorism, provides no encouragement to nations resisting terrorist groups, and cannot be immediately committed should war with a terrorist group or regime materialize. To win this the war on terrorism we need to develop a level of military readiness that can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to global terrorism, as indispensable support to our war on terrorism, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting terrorist groups in their nation, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitment should war with a terrorist group or regime materialize. A formal announcement of the 75th Ranger Regiment as the standing U.S. Global Strike Force (GSF) will fulfill this requirement.

The Ranger Regiment's unique capabilities make them ideally suited to fight this enemy that has no doctrine, cannot be templated as we have done with previous threats, does not mass his forces, and easily operates in the urban environment. The Ranger Regiment's ability from company to regiment to attack time sensitive targets with very restrictive rules of engagement at night on urban terrain with noncombatants while achieving decisive results without time consuming and risky massing of people and equipment provides the military with the direct action capability required to fight and win this war. As the GSF, the Rangers will give us the ability to put speed into the equation so we can exploit "information dominance" that we expect to obtain from intelligence sharing. The GSF will provide us with the leverage to impose our will on the terrorists by striking at their leadership and allowing us to maintain the initiative.

The designation of a GSF is consistent with utilizing all the national elements of power in the war on terrorism. Diplomatically, the GSF is a tool that provides a credible swift direct offensive action response option with global reach that can be used to deter and dissuade global terrorism. Informational operations can be conducted, as the Ranger Regiment is trained, ready, and will be committed against global terrorism. The Ranger Regiment will reach out and touch all global terrorists. Economically, the Ranger Regiment's reputation precedes

them and encourages other nations to resist global terrorist groups. Militarily, the Ranger Regiment routinely executes politically sensitive missions and stands by ready to execute on short notice no fail missions.

How do we measure success in the military arena? Success is deterring global terrorists from acting because they fear the military repercussions (invocation of Article 51 of the UN Charter – nations may attack to defend themselves); when we have all the military to military contacts required to put pressure on terrorist groups and the coalition is able to break up terrorist activity in the planning stage; and in the war against al Queda and the Taliban, when we have captured or killed all key leaders, including Osama bin Laden. Our military power should seek to eliminate sanctuary for terrorists. By eliminating sanctuary we reduce places for terrorist organizations to hide and limit their ability to recruit. We show terrorists that there is no room to use terrorism as a means of expression. We are draining the swamp.

CONCLUSION

For two decades – since Ayatollah Khomeini reached power in Iran in 1979 spouting "Death to America" – U.S. embassies, planes, ships, and barracks have been assaulted, leading to hundreds of American deaths. In the face of this, Washington hardly responded.²⁹

Rumsfield recalls saying to Bush that whenever the U.S. was attacked or threatened, the Clinton Administration had followed a pattern of "reflexive pullback." Rumsfield said he believed that U.S. power was needed to help discipline the world.³⁰

In 1980, Iran clearly understood President Reagan would not tolerate U.S. hostages. Iran recognized it was in their best interest to release the hostages, which they did hours after President Reagan's inauguration. Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and al Queda failed to recognize the change in U.S. leadership in 2001. President Bush was not President Clinton.

President Clinton had a history of responding weakly to terrorist attacks. We suspected Osama bin Laden was involved with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 93, Khobar Towers in 96, Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings in 98, and the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. President Clinton's only response was the launching of a cruise missile attack. America's deterrent strength had been eroded through the misapplication of the country's military power.³¹

Now in 2001, we suspect Osama bin Laden of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. No longer will oceans and mountains provide distance and a time shield to our nation. President Bush responded by striking back hard against all global terrorists, beginning with al Queda and the Taliban. As we begin this war we must not forget individuals may be suicidal, but states are not; regimes can be swayed, and when they resist being swayed they can be

destroyed.³² In this first phase of the global war on terrorism, we must use every tool to the fullest extent in attacking all the centers of gravity; militant Islam, the leadership of al Queda and the Taliban, and the loyal subordinates of al Queda and the Taliban.

We must be committed to decisive victory in Afghanistan because the world is watching how the only remaining superpower deals with terrorists with global reach. We must build America's image as a world power to be respected. Afghanistan must be an example to other terrorist groups and nations considering challenging the U.S. and its interests. We must convince allies and coalition partners they can trust American promises of support and we will not forget any nation again as we did with Afghanistan after we helped them defeat the Soviets. The campaign in Afghanistan is only the first phase of this lengthy war against international terrorism that we must fight as allies or members of a coalition.

After the first phase of this global war on terrorism in Afghanistan winds down we need to continue to seek out and destroy all al Queda cells worldwide along with other recognized global terrorist cells. We must leverage our unique asymmetrical advantages and capabilities in the GSF to take the fight to the terrorists anytime and anywhere on our terms, under conditions uniquely advantageous to us in Somalia, Sudan and other countries that harbor global terrorist organizations. The GSF will provide visible strikes and strike fear into the hearts of all terrorists as they realize there is no sanctuary. Special Forces in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Columbia training and providing planning guidance to military forces reduces further locations of sanctuary. Politically, our leaders must continue to use information operations to maintain the alliance and coalitions so the terrorists are isolated and information sharing leaves the terrorists networks with no space to recruit, train, plan and find refuge. Economically, we must continue to dry up their finances which will limit the room terrorist have to operate, move and work.

The water table in the swamp slowly drains as each national element of power is applied, simultaneously or sequentially. The global terrorist network reels from the shock of losing positional advantage the swamp provides and finding nowhere to hide frantically seeks a lower positional advantage. The United States must be relentless in draining the swamp so terrorists have no sanctuary, which will lead to their eventual destruction. There is no substitute for victory in this war. Decisive victory is the only acceptable solution. Decisive victory occurs when global terrorist leaders are convinced violence will not allow them to achieve their political agenda. We convince global terrorists by attacking their centers of gravity both directly and indirectly with all elements of national power.

We know we will be successful when threatened terrorism campaigns fail to materialize, but we will have to accept that there will be setbacks, however, everyday a terrorist act does not occur will be a victory against international terrorism. Our national will to win this protracted global war on terrorism must not waver. President Bush said, "This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing." We will win the war on global terrorism when the President, whoever it may be at the time, declares it.

WORD COUNT = 8649

ENDNOTES

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